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Discussions of European citizenship have tended to mobilise around two 
somewhat divergent views. The first view, well represented by Maurizio 
Ferrera’s argument for his ingenious proposals, treats this status instrumen-
tally: as a mechanism for promoting both greater allegiance to the EU from 
those individuals subject to its authority and greater solidarity amongst 
them. As with Ferrera’s argument, such views tend to conceive European 
citizenship in analogous terms to citizenship within the member states, with 
the goal being to wean individuals away from the national to the suprana-
tional, at least to some degree (Habermas’s 1992 essay remains the classic 
statement of this approach).1 By contrast, the second view, of which Christian 
Joppke’s contribution offers a fine example, treats European citizenship as 
transnational. So conceived, it involves not only denationalising citizenship 
but also transforming the very nature of citizenship itself.2 A citizen becomes 
no more than an individual bearer of liberal rights, with no special duties to 
any particular political community but only the moral obligations to uphold 
the liberal rights of all other individuals (actually Joppke is silent on this 
issue, but I assume de-dutification can only be taken so far).
Although Ferrera’s account moves in the direction of a supranational 
view, his policy proposals occupy a mid-point, providing a transitionary 
phase that seeks to reconcile the national to the transnational. By contrast to 
Joppke, I believe such a reconciliation is not only a pragmatically necessary 
endeavour but also normatively justifiable. However, I shall argue that the 
grounds for doing so indicate difficulties with the conventional supra- and 
1 Habermas, J (1992), ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on 
the Future of Europe’, Praxis International, 12 (1): 1–19.
2 For full accounts of this thesis, see: Kochenov, D. (2014), ‘EU Citizenship 
without Duties’, European Law Journal 20 (4): 482–498; Kostakopolou, D. 
(2004), ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’, European Law 
Journal 13 (5): 623–646.
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trans-national views of European citizenship, and point to an alternative 
view that I shall call inter-national.
As Andrea Sangiovanni has observed in his contribution, Ferrera’s 
declared grounding for his proposals beg the question of why the vast major-
ity of citizens of the different member states, who do not themselves take 
advantage of freedom of movement, should view further European integra-
tion and the creation of social solidarity at the European level as desirable in 
the first place. Although Ferrera does not articulate his reasoning explicitly, 
the implicit rationale would appear to be the two standard functional and 
moral arguments that are habitually offered for an ever closer Union. The 
functionalist case contends that in an interconnected world, the only way to 
take advantage of the economic benefits globalisation brings while manag-
ing its costs is through scaling up beyond the nation state. The moral case 
involves a form of cosmopolitanism, whereby the argument holds that if we 
are to treat all individuals as of equal moral worth we must likewise remove 
those political boundaries that entail treating them unequally. Both these 
arguments certainly need to be taken seriously. Whether they can only be 
adequately or appropriately addressed by a scaling up of political authority 
to the regional level or beyond is another matter.3
Given these arguments, the obvious question to ask is why we should 
take national citizenship seriously at all? As Joppke contends, surely the 
moral argument in particular suggests we should avoid either pandering to 
nationalism in the short term or replicating its exclusionary characteristics at 
the supranational level in the long term? One reason arises from the fact 
that, for all their faults, democratic nation states, such as those that are mem-
bers of the EU, provide the most effective political systems so far devised 
for rendering governments accountable to the governed in ways that encour-
age these governments to pursue policies aimed at treating the governed 
with equal concern and respect, and thereby securing their rights. Pace the 
transnational de-dutifyers, individual rights claims are likely to go unheeded 
without some political and legal authority capable of upholding them con-
sistently and coherently over time. Meanwhile, that authority will only be 
likely to uphold these rights in an impartial and fair way if suitably con-
strained to do so, with the most effective constraint being to subject rulers to 
a system of equal influence and control by the ruled. As a result of such a set 
3 For a discussion of these two views, see: Bellamy, R. (2015), ‘Between 
Cosmopolis and Community: Justice and Legitimacy in A European Union of 
Peoples’, in S. Tierney (ed.), Nationalism and Globalisation: New Settings, 
New Challenges, 207–232. London: Hart.
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up, citizenship becomes the ‘right to have rights’.4 Indeed, it could be argued 
that it is only within such a context that rights can be either effectively or 
legitimately claimed.5 For it is only through participating, on the one hand, 
in a scheme of social and economic cooperation capable of supporting 
expenditure on a suitable public infrastructure needed to secure rights; and, 
on the other hand, within a scheme of political cooperation through which 
individual rights can be claimed, justified and agreed to on equal terms to 
others, that a system of rights that is fair and sustainable can emerge. The 
duties that arise from involvement in these two schemes may have gained a 
romantic, nationalist colouring, yet as Andrea Sangiovanni notes they are 
for the most part prosaic – paying taxes, treating others with civility – not 
least by accepting the rules of the political game, and acknowledging the 
obligation to treat others with equal concern and respect.
The transnational view tends to overlook the role democratic states have 
had and continue to have in generating rights not only for their citizens but 
also for those citizens of other countries who may temporarily move to visit 
or work there. They treat them as self-evident moral properties of individu-
als that apparently can be met spontaneously.6 Many proponents of the 
transnational view among legal academics have also been overly sanguine 
about the judicialisation of the EUs transnational citizenship provisions, 
which has largely occurred as an extension of the lex mercatoria of the sin-
gle market.7 As Susanne Schmidt remarks in her contribution, the deploy-
ment of litigation by market actors gains a false legitimacy from exploiting 
the terminology of citizenship rights. For it allows those actors with an eco-
nomic interest in further market integration – the majority of which are 
enterprises rather than individuals – a privileged venue that is biased against, 
and often inaccessible by, the immobile majority, undermining the relative 
political equality offered by democratic citizenship.8 Nevertheless, transna-
tional critics are right to note that many of these same states have been, and 
4 See: Bellamy, R. (2001), ‘The “Right to have Rights”: Citizenship Practice and 
the Political Constitution of the EU’, in R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh (eds.) 
Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, 41–70. London; 
New York: Continuum
5 Bellamy, R. (2012a), ‘Rights as Democracy’, Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 15 (4): 449–471.
6 For a detailed critique see: Bellamy, R. (2015), ‘A Duty-Free Europe? What’s 
Wrong with Kochenov’s Account of EU Citizenship Rights’, European Law 
Journal 21 (4): 558–565.
7 Bellamy, R. (2015b), see above.
8 Isiksel, T. (2016), Europe’s Functional Constitution: A Theory of 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
142–143.
Balancing the Rights of European Citizenship with Duties Towards National…
242
still can be, great sources of injustice for those individuals and whole peo-
ples they have dominated either directly, through colonisation and war, or 
indirectly, through exploitative trade deals, and who they continue to exclude 
through various immigration policies.
In this regard, the supranational solution might seem superior because it 
can overcome the possibility of domination and exclusion simply by being 
more inclusive of who is a citizen. Yet, as Ferrera acknowledges, establish-
ing anything coming close to such a social and political system at the national 
level required a long period of political struggle facilitated by mass con-
scription in war, which gave ordinary people a degree of leverage over those 
whose wars they were obliged to fight – not least in prompting the establish-
ment of social insurance and ultimately the granting of universal adult suf-
frage. Meanwhile, a degree of bonding sufficient to agree upon and abide by 
collectively binding decisions was facilitated not only by boundaries delin-
eating among whom they were made and to whom they applied, as Ferrera 
reports, but also by a common history, culture and language. These latter 
features in particular may belong to the romantic attachments that Joppke 
deplores as reactionary throw-backs, but they served a functional purpose in 
facilitating the operation of democracy as a mechanism for the public reali-
sation of the equal status of citizens. For to achieve that result, citizens must 
be able to air their disagreements and deliberate in ways all can see are fair 
and addressed to their common concerns, all of which assumes a public 
sphere and shared interests. As the events currently unfolding in Catalonia 
indicate, where these features are deemed to be lacking, then large numbers 
of people are likely to be willing to exercise their liberal rights to freedom of 
speech and association to militate for a political community that can embody 
them and can only be prevented from doing so through coercion.
Such factors make a rapid shift to supra-nationalism unlikely if not 
unfeasible a priori. Even if achievable, however, it may also be undesirable. 
There are a plurality of reasonable ways of combining and pursuing the 
goods that give value to human lives, and even among liberal democracies 
there can be found a variety of economic, social, legal and political systems. 
Within a large, socially and culturally diverse political unit, the risk of com-
mon policies being inefficient and inequitable increases, along with the 
prospect of majority tyranny over consistent minorities. Finally, just as in a 
domestic political system, checks and balances between different institu-
tions can be important for ensuring that individuals and groups of individu-
als all get treated with equal concern and respect in the making and 
implementation of collective policies, so a collaborative system of mutually 
checking and balancing states can operate in a similar manner.
Against this background, an alternative characterisation of Ferrera’s pro-
posals holds that they comprise not transitional steps aimed at easing and 
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promoting a gradual shift towards the development of a European supra- 
national citizenship but as components of an inter-national European citi-
zenship designed to supplement rather supplant national citizenship in 
response to the functional and moral arguments reported above. Such a sta-
tus forms part of a more general international arrangement aimed at promot-
ing equality of concern and respect between the citizenship regimes of its 
constituent member states, not least by facilitating the movement of citizens 
between these different regimes. Within an interconnected world, the 
national citizens of democratic states can be regarded as having obligations 
not to dominate the national citizens of other democratic states, not least by 
undercutting their capacity for self-government. They also have joint obli-
gations to address problems that can only be tackled through collaboration 
and that involve harms and injustices that almost all moral systems regard as 
such. These include the prevention of the most egregious infringements of 
basic human rights, and the need to tackle global poverty and avoid a cli-
matic catastrophe. A feature of such an arrangement is that it does not seek 
to subsume national citizenship regimes within a more encompassing supra-
national regime but rather to facilitate their effective and legitimate opera-
tion through cooperation and the mutual regulation of their interactions.
I have argued elsewhere that to a large, if imperfect, extent the EU con-
forms to this kind of arrangement,9 not least through its decision making 
involving the normative logic of a two-level game whereby governments 
reach consensual agreements as the representatives of their respective peo-
ples, from whom these agreements must be capable of winning their accep-
tance over time. I call such an arrangement a form of ‘republican 
intergovernmentalism’. Union citizenship likewise can be assimilated to 
this account as a form of inter-national citizenship. Inter-national citizenship 
has two main aims. On the one hand, it addresses both the functional and the 
cosmopolitan critiques of national citizenship regimes by allowing citizens 
to move freely between these regimes without discrimination on grounds of 
nationality so far as access to employment or short or long-term residence is 
concerned. On the other hand, though, it remains justified to maintain the 
viability and diversity of these citizenship regimes and the solidarity among 
national citizens that make them possible. After all, they remain the source 
of the rights that mobile citizens move to enjoy. That can involve rules limit-
ing immediate access to certain social benefits in the case of individuals who 
have yet to find employment and contribute to them. It would also justify 
giving a vote only in local as opposed to national elections for those unwill-
ing to become national citizens and to commit to the future sustainability of 
9 Bellamy, R. (2013), ‘An Ever Closer Union of Peoples: Republican 
Intergovernmentalism, Demoi-cracy and Representation in the EU’, Journal of 
European Integration 35 (5): 499–516.
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the citizenship regime. Finally, it would entail the possibility – as suggested 
by Ferrera – for states that are a party to this arrangement to collectively 
agree on some indemnification for those national citizens who lose out. Note 
that in this conception of citizenship the source of rights is strictly speaking 
provided by the contracting states that agree to this arrangement and fulfil 
the obligations necessary to their realisation rather than any supra-national 
entity per se. Hence, it is logical that the entitlement to access this status 
stems from being a citizen of one of the contracting states. Moreover, the 
rights associated with an ‘inter-national’ conception are ‘isopolitical’ rather 
than ‘sympolitical’. The policies that Ferrera proposes can all be offered on 
this account on ‘isopolitical’ grounds – as part of the mutual recognition and 
associated duties of the citizenship regimes of the member states.
As I remarked, this account fits the existing citizenship provisions rela-
tively well, at least once the relevant directives are taken alongside the rights 
enumerated in the Treaties. As Schmidt notes, it has been the reading in of 
an aspirational, transnational, account of citizenship by the Court post 
Grzelczek that has distorted the justified balance between the rights of 
European citizenship and their duties towards (as well as of) national citi-
zens that lies at the heart of this status. Similarly, though Ferrera tackles a 
genuine and pressing issue in an innovative and imaginative way, I believe 
his approach will have not only more appeal but also a better justification 
through being grounded in an inter- rather than a supra- national account of 
European citizenship.
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